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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter explores the foundation and content of the duty to respect persons. The au­
thors argue that it is best understood as a duty to recognize people’s rights. Respect for 
persons therefore has specific implications for how competent and non-competent per­
sons ought to be treated in research. For competent persons it underlies the obligation to 
obtain consent to many research procedures. The chapter gives an analysis of the re­
quirements for obtaining valid consent. It then considers respect for persons as it relates 
to four common topics: the therapeutic misconception, research with children and adoles­
cents, the use of deception in research, and research on competent adults without their 
consent.
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Theory
Introduction
“Respect for persons” is widely regarded as a foundational ethical principle for research 
ethics.1 Core guidance documents for research ethics in multiple countries—including the 
United States, Canada, and South Africa—explicitly cite “respect for persons” as one of 
the small set of ethical principles that underlie their regulations and guidelines (National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
1978; Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Re­
search Council of Canada, and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 2018; 
South Africa Department of Health 2015). In this chapter, we explore the foundation and 
content of the duty to respect persons in the context of human subjects research.
We begin with a brief analysis of the two key terms: “respect” and “persons.” After sur­
veying some prominent accounts of each, we propose that respect for persons in research 
is best understood as a form of recognition respect for rights-holders. One important role 
for respect for persons is that it grounds the requirement to obtain consent from au­
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tonomous research participants. We analyze the conditions under which someone can ex­
ercise their autonomy rights to give valid consent. We then briefly illustrate some impor­
tant theoretical aspects of respect for persons by applying our analysis to four perennial 
topics in research ethics: (1) research with people at risk for a therapeutic misconcep­
tion, (2) research with children and adolescents, (3) the use of deception in research, and 
(4) conducting research on competent adults without obtaining their consent.
“Respect”
The term “respect” is used in multiple ways. We may say that we respect someone’s hon­
esty or willingness to stand up to bullies. We may say that someone does or should re­
spect the rules of the road. We may respect the strength of the tide, the power of a bear, 
or the accuracy of our opponent’s serve. And we may enjoin someone to respect the flag, 
the dead, or their elders. Clearly, many of these are fitting attitudes to take toward 
nonpersons. So which, if any, matches the sense of respect for persons, where that is 
thought to have entailments about what individuals should or should not do?
Philosophers have proposed various taxonomies of respect.2 When it comes to persons, 
the key distinction is between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect” (Darwall 
1977). “Appraisal respect” involves a positive judgment of a person or a person’s quali­
ties. For example, respecting someone’s honesty entails making a positive judgment 
about how honest that person is. This can be a matter of degree: it is possible to have dif­
fering amounts of respect for someone and to have more respect for one person than an­
other. For example, we may have greater appraisal respect for someone’s honesty when 
we see that person speak the truth in a context where doing so is contrary to their inter­
ests. “Recognition respect,” on the other hand, involves giving appropriate weight to 
some fact in one’s deliberations. For example, you might respect the strength of the tide 
by not swimming out too far. Here, it is prudent to give due weight to the danger of being 
swept out to sea. Likewise, in respecting the flag, the dead, or your elders, you treat spe­
cific facts about them as reasons to act in certain ways. The fact that a corpse is a dead 
human, for instance, puts limits on the ways in which it would be appropriate to dispose 
of it.
The respect involved in respect for persons is a form of recognition respect rather than 
appraisal respect. As Stephen Darwall puts it,
To have recognition respect for someone as a person is to give appropriate weight 
to the fact that he or she is a person by being willing to constrain one’s behavior 
in ways required by that fact. … Recognition respect for persons, then, is identical 
with recognition respect for the moral requirements that are placed on one by the 
existence of other persons (1977, 45).
Thus, it is someone’s moral status as a person that warrants respect. The extent to which 
that respect is due does not vary depending on an appraisal of that person’s character— 
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someone does not merit more or less respect, as a person, on the basis of whether we re­
gard them as particularly virtuous or vicious, smart or foolish, and so on.
Recognition respect also admits of different interpretations. It is usually understood in 
terms of beliefs and behavior, but some take it to be accompanied by a distinct feeling of 
respect.3 Immanuel Kant, for example, characterized respect for persons as involving 
“reverence” (1956, chap. 3; 1964, 68–69)—a felt recognition of the “sublime” (1951, bk. 
2, 82–106). Persons are sublime, Kant thought, because they have the power to reason. In 
the next section, we note reasons to be wary of the Kantian interpretation of persons. We 
favor Darwall’s interpretation of recognition respect, which makes no mention of any par­
ticular feeling.
“Persons”
Respect for persons is a form of recognition respect, which places different and more 
stringent moral requirements on our interactions with persons than with non-persons. To 
work out what that entails for research ethics, we also need to know what persons are. 
This, it turns out, is a vexed question.
The question—what are persons?—is not raised by the guidance documents that refer­
ence respect for persons as a foundational principle. Those documents simply assume 
that the set of persons is the set of human beings. But, ethically speaking, this view is 
surely incorrect. If persons are due some particular moral consideration in virtue of being 
persons, then they must possess some characteristics that are distinctive of persons and 
justify that consideration. On its face, membership of the species Homo sapiens does not 
seem like the sort of characteristic that could justify special treatment. It is hard to see 
how having a shared genetic, physiological, and anatomic makeup could matter morally 
any more than having a shared eye color, language, or nationality. Moreover, singling out 
the biological category of “species” seems arbitrary, given that there are multiple biologi­
cal categories into which humans fall—we are also primates, bipeds, mammals, and so 
forth. The view that one’s species has special moral importance has been dubbed 
“speciesism” (Singer 1995). Like racism, which seeks to justify differential moral treat­
ment of beings on the prejudicial grounds of racial categories, so speciesism seeks to jus­
tify this treatment on the prejudicial grounds of a particular biological category whose 
choice appears arbitrary.
Persons and humans are not necessarily identical. Nevertheless, in looking for a charac­
teristic that defines personhood and grounds the special moral consideration that persons 
warrant, philosophers have looked to characteristics that are distinctive of paradigmatic 
persons—typical adult humans. This approach makes sense. We are confident that, who­
ever else ends up counting as a person, typical adult humans must. If a view of person­
hood implied that, say, the reader of this chapter was not a person, we would judge that 
the view was false or was simply describing some other concept.
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One characteristic that is frequently identified as both distinctive of humans and a possi­
ble ground for respect is our capacity to reason. Immanuel Kant identifies this as the 
source of humanity’s dignity and so the duty to respect others as ends in themselves:
a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical 
reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to 
be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as 
an end in itself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which 
he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world. He can 
measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing 
of equality with them (1999, 434–435).
Thus, for Kant, the ability to reason and to set ends for oneself on the basis of that rea­
soning is the grounds for the respect of others. All and only moral agents warrant this re­
spect.
Other philosophers single out the capacity for self-evaluation as what matters. For exam­
ple, Harry Frankfurt argues that what is distinctive about persons is their capacity to 
form “second-order volitions” (1971). He notes that many creatures have desires, such as 
an animal’s desire to eat or to escape a threat. However, what separates persons from 
other creatures is a capacity for reflective self-evaluation: they want certain desires to be 
their will. A drug addict might crave heroin but want not to want the drug. They might 
want that second-order desire to be what guides their action. In this way, Frankfurt points 
out, only persons can attain another frequently identified mark of personhood: enjoying 
or lacking freedom of the will. When the craving is too strong, the drug addict may lack 
freedom of the will in that they cannot put their preferred desire into action. However, if 
they achieve and maintain sobriety, they free themselves by making their second-order 
desire effective.
These views capture some distinctive features of typical adults. However, they also seem 
to draw the lines too narrowly. A three-year-old human, for example, is not a good candi­
date for being a rational being and would not be expected to engage in much reflective 
self-evaluation. We would certainly not hold that person morally responsible for their ac­
tions or think that they should be permitted to make decisions about their life in the same 
way as a competent adult. But it seems highly implausible to claim that a three-year-old is 
not a person and so merits less moral consideration than persons. Rather, many people 
think that young children should be given greater protection than competent adults. In­
deed, the dominant view in research ethics is that the risks to which it is permissible to 
expose children in research are considerably lower than the risks to which it is permissi­
ble to expose (consenting) adults.
Considering these problems, one might take a different tack. An alternative defining char­
acteristic by which to distinguish persons from non-persons would be sentience. Whether 
an action harms or benefits someone is generally thought to be a critical consideration 
when evaluating the ethics of the action.4 If someone is sentient, then matters can go well 
or badly for them, so it makes sense to talk of their well-being and of them being harmed 
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or benefited. However, if something always lacks sentience, then it is hard to make sense 
of matters going well or badly for it. On this way of thinking, those beings that are never 
sentient are relevant to ethical analysis only insofar as they matter to sentient beings. 
The apple matters only because it could provide nutrition to someone who is hungry; the 
flag matters only because it has symbolic importance to citizens of a particular country.
However, while treating sophisticated cognitive capacities, such as rationality or will for­
mation, as the foundation for personhood makes the criteria too narrow, treating more 
rudimentary capacities as its foundation risks making the criteria too broad. Even the 
simplest of sentient creatures would now count as persons, including mice, frogs, fish, 
and (maybe) some insects (Braithwaite 2010; Klein and Barron 2016; Pali-Schöll et al. 
2018). Given the amount of research conducted using nonhuman animals, this expansion 
would imply radical changes to how science is conducted. For example, most laboratory 
animals are killed following their use in experiments. On any standard understanding of 
respect for persons, it is grossly unethical to kill non-consenting persons in the search for 
knowledge. Even those who agree that all sentient creatures matter morally—so that in­
flicting unnecessary suffering on mice and fish is wrongful—may still believe that the con­
straints on killing do not apply to them in the same way as to persons.5
An intermediate view lowers the bar for the level of cognitive sophistication needed for 
personhood. For example, David DeGrazia and Joseph Millum (forthcoming) defend a 
“neo-Lockean” view, according to which personhood is tied to narrative identity: “A per­
son is a being who has a narrative identity—a relatively complex understanding of herself 
as persisting over time and as having an implicit life-story.” According to DeGrazia and 
Millum, it is this conception of oneself as a temporally extended being that explains why 
persons have rights and sentient non-persons do not. Moreover, some degree of narrative 
identity can be possessed by creatures who we would hesitate to describe as rational or 
capable of self-evaluation. The view can thereby include three-year-old humans in the 
class of persons without including fish as well.
Any account of what a person is that is inclusive enough to include very young children 
will also include some more cognitively advanced nonhuman animals. Depending on the 
details of the account, this might include the other great apes, other primates, other 
mammals, and so on.6 On the other hand, any account of what a person is that sets the 
bar above mere sentience will exclude some non-paradigm humans, such as individuals 
who are severely cognitively disabled.7 To some theorists, these implications are trou­
bling.
Some theorists who seek to preserve a special status for non-paradigm humans argue 
that the kind of moral status that merits respect can be acquired through relationships 
with other persons or the capacity to form such relationships. For example, Eva Kittay 
(2005) argues that a severely cognitively disabled human can acquire full moral status by 
way of being a moral agent’s child. Others point to relational capacities such as the ca­
pacity to value,8 the capacity to actively participate as a rearee in person-rearing relation­
ships (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2014), the capacity to form relationships marked by 
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reciprocity (Mullin 2011), and even the capacity to give and receive love (Kittay 2013). 
Views like these can explain why we should respect non-autonomous beings like young 
children, humans with dementia, and humans with severe cognitive disabilities. Nonethe­
less, consistently applied, these accounts would also likely include some nonhuman ani­
mals as persons. After all, many mammals have the kind of emotional capacities required 
for long-lasting friendships and relationships of care, many form close and reciprocal at­
tachments, and many nurture their young.9
The question—what are persons?—will not be resolved here. This may frustrate a reader 
who wants a definitive answer. But it is precisely because the answer to this question is 
contested in philosophy and bioethics that we judge it more useful to provide an analysis 
of the duty to respect persons that is inclusive of a range of plausible theories of person­
hood. We now argue that we can make significant progress on understanding the princi­
ple of respect for persons in the context of research ethics if we interpret it as requiring 
recognition respect for rights-holders.
Respect for Persons as Recognition Respect for Rights-Holders
We can rule out some accounts of personhood as too narrow or too broad, but several 
plausible contenders remain. These accounts draw slightly different boundaries around 
personhood, but all imply that some persons are not humans (e.g., chimpanzees) and 
some humans are not persons (e.g., humans in persistent vegetative states). These ac­
counts also agree that there are special protections and entitlements that are due per­
sons. We think that these protections and entitlements can be helpfully conceptualized in 
terms of rights. The duty to respect persons can then be interpreted as a duty that re­
quires recognition respect for rights-holders. This is helpful for several reasons.
First, the purpose of this chapter is not to give an analysis of the principle of respect for 
persons simpliciter; the purpose is to explore the content and foundation of that principle 
in research ethics. Interpreting the duty as an obligation to pay recognition respect to 
rights-holders is consistent with how the principle is stated in research ethics guidance 
documents (notwithstanding their assumption that only humans are persons). These doc­
uments all connect respect for persons to autonomy and—implicitly—to respecting the ex­
ercise of autonomy rights. They are also clear that the relevant class of persons includes 
more than just autonomous agents and that special protections are owed to non-au­
tonomous persons. For example, the Belmont Report states, “Respect for persons incorpo­
rates at least two ethical convictions: first, that individuals should be treated as au­
tonomous agents, and second, that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to 
protection” (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research 1978). Canada’s Tri-Council Policy Statement says, “Respect for 
Persons incorporates the dual moral obligations to respect autonomy and to protect those 
with developing, impaired or diminished autonomy” (Canadian Institutes of Health Re­
search, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and Social 
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Sciences and Humanities Research Council 2018, 6). And the guidance from South 
Africa’s Department of Health states,
This principle requires that persons capable of deliberation about their choices 
must be treated with respect and permitted to exercise self-determination. Fur­
ther, persons who lack capacity or who have diminished capacity for deliberation 
about their choices must be protected against harm from irresponsible choices. 
Respect for persons recognises that dignity, well-being and safety interests of all 
research participants are the primary concern in research that involves human 
participants (2015, 14).
Second, given our aim, our analysis would have very limited value if it were pegged to a 
contested view of personhood since it would be useful only to those who accepted that 
view. Such a concession is unnecessary. The plausible views of personhood agree that it 
grounds rights. Hence, they agree that persons, whatever else they are, are rights-hold­
ers. Interpreting the principle of respect for persons as recognition respect for rights- 
holders leaves open the range of individuals who merit respect to be filled in by an ac­
count of who rights-holders are. If someone believes that rights are possessed only by 
certain humans and other cognitively sophisticated primates, then this will tell them that 
the scope of respect for persons extends just that far—likewise for one’s views on the 
rights of fetuses, patients in minimally conscious states, and other nonhuman animals. 
This allows us to understand what respect for persons entails, while acknowledging ethi­
cal disagreement about the exact scope of the principle.
Third, interpreting the principle as requiring recognition respect for rights-holders is use­
ful for ethical analysis not just because it is maximally inclusive of various theories of per­
sonhood but because we know more about what rights are and what respecting them en­
tails than we do about what persons are and what respecting them entails. Ethically 
speaking, rights function as constraints that protect individuals and their entitlements. As 
Leif Wenar puts it, “Rights permit their holders to act in certain ways, or give reasons to 
treat their holders in certain ways or permit their holders to act in certain ways, even if 
some social aim would be served by doing otherwise” (2015).10 So, for example, the fact 
that children have rights against being exposed to serious harms explains why it is not 
permissible to enroll young children in very risky research even if the expected harms to 
the children are lower than the expected benefits to society. Likewise, it is not permissi­
ble to inject a competent, conscious adult with a drug without that person’s permission. 
This is because the person has a right to decide for themselves what will be put into their 
body.
Finally, this interpretation allows us to preserve a key insight from the Kantian view that 
many people find plausible: that there is a non-instrumental value to persons. Rights limit 
the extent to which it is permissible to use individual persons for the benefit of others. To 
use the Kantian vocabulary, by respecting people’s rights, we treat them as ends in them­
selves, not merely as means to the ends of others.
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Rights
Since we think that the principle of respect for persons is best understood as a form of 
recognition respect for rights-holders, it will be helpful to say a little more about what 
rights are.11
For any putative right, we can ask who the right-holder is, what the right permits or re­
quires, and how stringent the right is. The internal structure of rights is frequently ana­
lyzed in terms of “Hohfeldian elements”: privileges, claims, powers, and immunities (Wes­
ley 1913).12 If someone has a privilege to perform some action, then that person is permit­
ted to perform it. For example, if you have a privilege to wear your Southampton F.C. 
scarf, then you are permitted to wear it. You would not violate any duty by doing so. If 
someone has a claim, then some other party or parties have a duty. For example, persons 
have a claim to bodily integrity, which entails that other people have a duty not to inter­
fere with their bodies in certain ways. Powers and immunities concern how privileges and 
claims can be changed or protected. If someone has a power, then that person can 
change what another person is permitted or required to do. For example, giving valid con­
sent is the exercise of a power over a claim: by giving valid consent to surgery, a patient 
removes the surgeon’s duty not to cut him. Finally, an immunity is a protection against 
someone else exercising a power. For example, even if a surgeon is convinced that a pa­
tient ought to have a surgery, that surgeon lacks the power to waive the patient’s claim to 
bodily integrity.
Though it is sometimes thought that if someone has a right, then that right can never 
(ethically) be overridden, this is not how rights are typically interpreted in applied ethics 
or law. Defamation laws, for example, provide legitimate limits on freedom of speech. In­
stead, we should think of rights as having thresholds: only when the consequences of 
overriding a right are sufficiently important does that justify doing so.13 These thresholds 
will vary depending on the importance of the right—that is, the stringency of the duty to 
respect someone’s right will vary. For example, it is sometimes judged permissible to use 
patients’ biological samples for research purposes even when they have not given con­
sent for such use (provided that the researchers are unable to contact the patients, that 
any possible harms are minimized, and so forth).14 One explanation of why this can be 
permissible is that the value of the research is sufficiently great that it justifies the minor 
infringement of patients’ rights to control what happens to their samples. By contrast, we 
can’t think of any realistic research situation in which it would be permissible to override 
someone’s right not to be killed. The threshold for that right is too high. We return to this 
discussion about thresholds in the “Applications” section of this chapter when we explore 
the permissibility of research without consent.
Consent
Autonomous individuals have the power to waive certain of their rights by giving valid 
consent. Doing so can give researchers permission to engage in all sorts of activities— 
viewing medical records, recording private conversations, injecting experimental drugs— 
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that would otherwise constitute rights violations. Any discussion of respect for persons in 
the context of research ethics must therefore address the conditions for valid consent.15
It is widely agreed that the following five conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient 
for valid consent: competence, disclosure, understanding, voluntariness, and a token of 
consent. Here, we give a brief gloss on each condition and how it can go wrong in the 
context of consent to research. Along the way we note areas where there is uncertainty or 
disagreement. We then turn our attention to the other functions of the informed consent 
process, which are more distantly related to respect for persons.
Competence
Consent will only be valid if the person giving consent has the competence (or capacity) 
to do so.16 Roughly speaking, someone is competent to make their own decisions if and 
only if they are able to reason about what to do in the light of the information they have 
and their values and make a decision on the basis of that reasoning.17 Competent per­
sons, then, are autonomous agents. Because they are capable of making autonomous de­
cisions, those decisions should be respected. This is one way we show competent persons 
recognition respect, and we disrespect them when we interfere with, ignore, or otherwise 
usurp their decision-making.
A competent person can decide on the basis of their values to refuse the medical care 
that their physician recommends. They can also give permission to a procedure that pos­
es risk, even though it will not benefit them but only provide information that might bene­
fit others. By contrast, someone who was not competent—a young child or someone with 
moderate dementia—would not have the right to make these decisions for themselves. We 
routinely override the objections of young children when they dissent from activities that 
are in their interests. While showing respect to a competent adult involves recognizing 
their right to make good or poor decisions, that lack of capacity in young children re­
quires that they be protected from harm. However, our decision-making capacity typically 
develops as we mature. In the subsection “Respect and Research with Children and Ado­
lescents” we explore whether and how researchers can show appropriate respect to chil­
dren and adolescents in light of their burgeoning decision-making capacities.
Two important practical issues are worth noting regarding competence. First, judgments 
about competence can be either global or local. The default presumption that adults are 
capable of giving consent reflects a global judgment that adults are competent, absent ev­
idence to the contrary. In many areas of practice, however, judgments about competence 
are made at a more local level. For example, the assessment of capacity to consent to a 
research study may be specific to that particular study and whether the potential partici­
pant is capable of understanding and reasoning about the specific procedures involved. 
For the most part, we think that it is correct to view competence as decision-specific 
rather than global. Someone might, for example, be unable to consent to a complex re­
search study involving multiple procedures and a complicated risk–benefit trade-off; yet 
they might remain competent to manage their day-to-day financial affairs. Further, for pa­
tients with marginal autonomy, there may be conditions under which they are capable of 
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making their own decisions and conditions under which they are not. For example, a pa­
tient with mild dementia may have higher cognitive functioning in the morning, have low­
er anxiety in a familiar setting, and be able to use their partner as a support for re­
minders about pieces of personal information that slip their mind. In the morning, at 
home, with their partner, they may be competent to make medical and research deci­
sions. Later, in a strange hospital, and alone, they may lack competence. Researchers 
need to be sensitive to the contextual factors that affect decision-making ability and en­
deavor to obtain consent under circumstances that best enable individuals to decide for 
themselves.
The second important practical issue regards the threshold for competence. Research of­
ten involves complex procedures. There may be few people capable of truly understand­
ing what those procedures involve, even for common procedures such as magnetic reso­
nance imaging (MRI).18 Likewise, everyone is subject to biases that impede their deci­
sion-making.19 The capacity to understand everything and reason flawlessly therefore 
cannot be required for competence. Where exactly the line should be drawn is a matter of 
debate. It is important to get it right because making competence requirements too strict 
and making them too lenient both come with substantial ethical costs. In the one case, in­
dividuals who have the right to make their own decisions will have that right impinged 
upon; in the other, individuals who need protection may suffer the consequences of poor 
decisions.
Disclosure
When a competent person makes a decision about whether to participate in research, it is 
their decision to make. In order to enable them to make this decision, certain information 
must be disclosed.20
Regulations and guidelines go into great detail on what must be disclosed. For example, 
the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki states,
In medical research involving human subjects capable of giving informed consent, 
each potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources 
of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations of the re­
searcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the study and the discom­
fort it may entail, post-study provisions and any other relevant aspects of the 
study. The potential subject must be informed of the right to refuse to participate 
in the study or to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. 
(World Medical Association 2013, Guideline 26)
The manner of disclosure is important as well as the content that is disclosed. We disre­
spect prospective participants’ decision-making capacity when we disclose information in 
a way that is predictably hard to understand, is misleading, or feeds known misconcep­
tions. So, for example, the use of lots of scientific jargon is likely to impede understand­
ing for most research participants—consent forms full of such language would not meet 
the disclosure requirement and therefore would not show appropriate respect. We ex­
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plore the practical implications of this requirement in the subsection “Respect and the 
Therapeutic Misconception” when we discuss the therapeutic misconception in 
research.21
Understanding
Valid consent also requires that the person giving consent understand certain informa­
tion. At a minimum, they must understand that what they are doing is giving consent—for 
example, that by signing this form they are giving permission for the researcher to pro­
ceed. What more they must understand is a matter of debate. On one prominent view, the 
understanding requirement protects participants’ interests (Wendler and Grady 2008). 
They must therefore understand the information about a research study that is relevant 
to their interests. So, for example, major or common risks of a research intervention must 
be understood because they involve potential harm. On another view, the understanding 
requirement protects participants’ ability to direct their life according to their own values 
(Faden, Beauchamp, and King 1986). On this view, potential participants must understand 
the information that is likely to be relevant to their decision about whether to consent. 
Major or common risks of a research intervention must therefore be understood because 
people often care about risk.
A more minimal view of the understanding requirement separates what must be disclosed 
from what must be understood.22 On our version of this view, the primary function of dis­
closure is not to achieve understanding but to avoid a form of illegitimate control 
(Bromwich and Millum 2015; Millum and Bromwich 2018). Omitting to disclose a major or 
common risk would constitute such control because it would be likely to mislead the par­
ticipant about how dangerous the study is and so potentially affect their consent decision. 
Such risks do not actually have to be understood in order to give valid consent. Provided 
that the person giving consent has been given a fair opportunity to understand the risks— 
such as through a clearly written consent form and an open-ended discussion of the study 
—they can give consent without actually understanding the risks. They just need to un­
derstand what they are waiving their right to; that is, what the researcher proposes to do 
that requires consent. This view makes sense of how we can give consent to acts whose 
risks no one knows, which is common when research studies test experimental drugs, de­
vices, or techniques.
Voluntariness
A competent agent may fully understand what they are agreeing to and still give invalid 
consent if it is not given voluntarily. The paradigmatic situation in which voluntariness is 
undermined is one of coercion. On a widely accepted model of coercion, it occurs when 
one agent presents a credible threat to violate the rights of another unless they comply 
with the other’s demands (Wertheimer 1987). For example, the robber who presents a 
gun and says, “Your money or your life,” is coercing the victim. If the victim hands over 
their valuables, they have not given valid consent to the robber’s ownership. Although 
there are important historical examples of people who were coerced into research, it is 
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now very rare for participants to be coerced into agreeing to research participation, as 
far as we are aware.23
Another way in which voluntariness can be undermined is through deception. If someone 
is deceived about what act they are consenting to, then they cannot have given consent to 
that act. For example, if a physician asks for consent to inject a research participant with 
saline but in fact injects the participant with a radioactive isotope, their agreement to be 
injected is invalid because they have only agreed to the saline injection. Some deception 
is not about the act itself but nevertheless invalidates consent. If the fact about which 
someone is deceived is relevant to the decision, the deceiver may have illegitimately con­
trolled the consent decision. For example, lying about whether radiation therapy for 
prostate cancer poses risks of impotence and incontinence might predictably make pa­
tients more likely to agree to it.
While most scholars agree that deception can invalidate consent, they disagree about 
how and why it does so. The forgoing explanation tells us that deception invalidates con­
sent by undermining voluntariness. Others argue, on the other hand, that when certain 
facts are deceptively withheld, consent is invalidated because the person giving consent 
did not understand some fact necessary for a valid authorization. We explore the implica­
tions of these views for the ethics of deceptive research in the subsection “Respect and 
Deception.”
Token
Finally, the person must actually give consent. This requires that they provide some indi­
cation that signifies that consent has been granted. In clinical research, this is typically 
achieved through a signature on a consent form. However, valid consent need not be for­
malized in this way. In clinical care, consent may be given to many common procedures 
with no paperwork at all. The physician asks if they can palpate your stomach and you say 
“Sure thing.” The nurse says they’re going to inject you, asks for your arm, and you give 
it. Ethically speaking, these communicate consent just as effectively as a signature.
There are pros and cons to the default of requiring written consent to research participa­
tion. Consent forms have the advantage that they provide a record of whether consent 
was given and to what. In the right circumstances, they can also be a helpful tool for con­
veying information. For example, participants can be sent a consent form well ahead of 
being asked for consent and so have the opportunity to learn about the research study at 
their leisure. On the other hand, reliance on the consent form to provide information risks 
taking the focus away from the person-to-person interactions that appear to be the best 
way to improve understanding (Flory and Emanuel 2004). Research ethics committees 
are notorious for nitpicking the wording of consent forms. They have much less to say 
about—and little opportunity to oversee—the process through which participants are told 
about the research and given the opportunity to ask questions. For some low-risk studies, 
consent forms may also be excessive. For example, if a researcher is recruiting for a short 
survey, simply filling out the survey might be sufficient to indicate consent. Finally, in rare 
cases, obtaining written consent might compromise the obligation of recognition respect 
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by putting participants at risk or being culturally inappropriate (Wendler and Rackoff 
2001). For example, consider a sociologist interviewing sex workers in a country where 
such work is stigmatized and illegal. Participants might reasonably be concerned about 
their confidentiality if required to sign a form that describes the population being studied.
Other Functions of the Consent Process
While the primary goal of the informed consent process is to obtain valid consent to re­
search participation, it also serves other functions. Some include institutional protection 
and the promotion of trust in the research enterprise (Dickert et al. 2017). Others further 
promote the well-being and decision-making of research participants. For example, many 
institutional and legal requirements for informed consent are designed to protect partici­
pants’ interests (Brock 2008). Multiple studies around the world have examined how 
much participants in clinical research understand.24 They show very variable levels of un­
derstanding, including substantial numbers of apparently competent participants who 
cannot recall key risks or distinguish between research and clinical care (Mandava et al. 
2012). These are the respects in which research is most likely to diverge from partici­
pants’ interests. When the informed consent process is designed to facilitate understand­
ing, encourage reflection on the enrollment decision, and generally promote a decision 
made in accordance with interests, preferences, and values, participants are more likely 
to make prudent enrollment decisions. In this way, the informed consent process demon­
strates an aspirational commitment to the ideal of good decision-making, rather than 
merely a minimal commitment to obtaining a valid rights waiver (Bromwich and Millum 
2017).
Applications
We can derive some clear implications about how we ought to treat prospective research 
participants from the forgoing analysis of the principle of respect for persons as requiring 
recognition respect for rights-holders. For example, when persons are capable of au­
tonomous decision-making, recognizing their right to control certain aspects of their lives 
—like whether to participate in a study—requires that we disclose those facts that are ex­
pected to be relevant to an enrollment decision in an understandable way. However, some 
theoretical issues are contested, and different research populations and research meth­
ods raise distinctive challenges for how researchers should show respect. In what follows, 
we briefly consider four issues: the therapeutic misconception, research with children 
and adolescents, the use of deception, and research without consent. For each, we dis­
cuss the implications of the theoretical analysis for the practical challenges posed.
Respect and the Therapeutic Misconception
Prospective participants often have inaccurate beliefs about the studies in which they en­
roll. These can be amplified—and may even be formed—by the content and manner in 
which information about studies is disclosed. One common inaccurate belief is the “thera­
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peutic misconception,” which refers to a mistaken tendency among clinical research par­
ticipants to believe that research procedures are being carried out primarily or even sole­
ly for their medical benefit.25 It was first observed in psychiatric patient participants, but 
it has now been observed in a wide range of medical research populations (Applebaum, 
Roth, and Lidz 1982; Applebaum and Lidz 2008). On some views about what is needed for 
valid consent, the therapeutic misconception has the potential to invalidate consent, as 
well as lead to poor decision-making.
More expansive views of what needs to be understood in order to give valid consent to re­
search typically include that participants should understand the aims of the study in 
which they enroll. It is implausible that participants can understand these aims if they 
mistakenly believe that the research procedures involved are conducted primarily or sole­
ly for their personal benefit. Given the prevalence of the therapeutic misconception, an 
expansive view of the understanding requirement would imply that a radical overhaul of 
the informed consent process should be carried out in order to improve comprehension of 
the research–care distinction.
It would also raise sobering ethical questions about past research. After all, many re­
search studies have included persons with the therapeutic misconception. And yet since 
learning this, little has been done to change the way in which these participants are en­
rolled. Should those who have continued to conduct and sponsor research with disregard 
for this misconception be condemned for the alleged rights violations that have occurred? 
Should clinical research be halted until the therapeutic misconception has been fully ad­
dressed? Is the scholarly research ethics community guilty of merely paying lip service to 
the duty to respect persons when they refuse to engage seriously with these questions?
On the other hand, if a more minimal view of the understanding requirement is correct, 
the muted reaction to the therapeutic misconception might be justified. On the view we 
outlined above, it is possible to give valid consent to research participation even if you 
have false beliefs about the primary purpose of research interventions. For example, 
someone might agree to a blood draw but mistakenly believe it is for clinically necessary 
tests and not for answering scientific questions. Still, on the minimal view, provided the 
person knows that it will involve someone inserting a needle into a vein and withdrawing 
blood, their consent can be valid.
A proponent of the minimal view of the understanding requirement might even think that 
it would be disrespectful not to enroll a participant with the therapeutic misconception. If 
they are otherwise eligible for the study, it seems paternalistic to exclude them on the 
grounds that they have not understood enough to make a prudent enrollment decision, 
provided that they have understood enough to give valid consent. Whether such partici­
pants ultimately should or should not be enrolled in studies will depend on our answers to 
other questions. In particular, it will depend on researchers’ duties of beneficence, which 
might entail that they should exclude individuals from studies who are making particular­
ly poor decisions. It will also depend on whether potential participants have any right to 
enroll in research studies or whether that is up to the individual investigator.
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Finally, though proponents of the minimal view do not think that having a therapeutic 
misconception is itself sufficient to invalidate consent, there are ways in which it can lead 
to invalid consent even for them. Recall the discussion of the disclosure requirement. One 
way in which disclosure can go awry is through misrepresenting information that the per­
son obtaining consent expects to be relevant to a potential participant’s consent decision. 
False beliefs can be communicated not only through deliberate deception but by what is 
implied (or implicated). So, for example, not to mention a major risk during the consent 
process communicates, by implication, that there is no such risk. Why? Because it is rea­
sonable for a patient to assume that a clinician would mention all the major risks of which 
they are aware during a conversation that focused on medical procedures and their risks 
and benefits.
In the same way, if a researcher knows that a potential participant has false beliefs about 
the therapeutic intent of a research study, failing to address or challenge those beliefs 
may implicitly confirm them. It is reasonable for those in the grips of the misconception 
to think that if they were mistaken about the primary purpose of research interventions, 
they would be told explicitly. Since we are exposed to written terms and conditions re­
plete with legal boilerplate and institutional protections that we frequently ignore without 
suffering adverse consequences, it is also reasonable for participants to dismiss or miss 
statements about the official aims of research buried in consent forms. Most people likely 
assume that if the information is really important, it will be made plain. And that is a nat­
ural expectation in the research context too. When these kinds of expectations are at play 
and when the usual mode of communication does not dislodge them, researchers may 
misleadingly implicate their truth through their disclosure. It is therefore possible to in­
validate consent to research participation even when all the relevant facts are disclosed if 
they are disclosed in a manner that is known to confuse, mislead, or feed an existing mis­
conception.
Respect and Research with Children and Adolescents
Scientific research is conducted with children of all ages, and their inclusion raises two 
major issues that relate to recognition respect. The first is that, as non-autonomous per­
sons, many children are not able to make decisions that protect their own interests, and 
they lack the legal authority to give consent. While children’s parents or legal guardians 
must give permission for their inclusion in research, appropriate respect for their non-in­
strumental value requires instituting additional protections (US Department of Health 
and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, and Office for Human Research Pro­
tections 2018). Yet respect for these rights-holders does not begin and end with proxy 
consent or additional institutional safeguards because, as children develop, so does their 
capacity for autonomous decision-making. This raises the second issue of whether and 
how to respect their burgeoning capacity for self-governance.
First, children are shown respect in research by being afforded extra protections. Most 
research ethics guidelines and regulations protect a child’s right not to be exposed to se­
rious harm by precluding high-risk pediatric research that does not offer a compensating 
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prospect of direct benefit.26 The US Common Rule permits pediatric research that poses a 
minor increase over minimal risk without compensating direct benefit to the child only if, 
among other conditions, “The intervention or procedure is likely to yield generalizable 
knowledge about the subjects’ disorder or condition which is of vital importance for the 
understanding or amelioration of the subjects’ disorder or condition” (US Department of 
Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, and Office for Human Re­
search Protections 2018). Any more risky research would require a determination by the 
secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services following consultation with a 
panel of experts and a period of public review and comment (US Department of Health 
and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, and Office for Human Research Pro­
tections 2018). This regulatory option has been rarely used.27 Restrictions on pediatric 
risks in other countries are similar or more strict when it comes to risks that are not 
counterbalanced by expected health benefits to the child participant.28
These protections safeguard children against being used merely as means to scientific 
ends, even if those ends are socially valuable. They also ensure that children are treated 
fairly and equally as these safeguards protect children from being exposed to excessive 
harms even if their parents or legal guardians would allow it. All in all, these protections 
respect children by ensuring that pediatric research is constrained to recognize the non- 
instrumental value of its subjects.
Second, the capacity for autonomous decision-making develops over time, and this raises 
important questions about whether and how to recognize and respect it. While a toddler 
may completely lack values and the ability to reflect on their decisions, a six-year-old may 
be able to plan ahead, be able to anticipate how something will feel, and want to help oth­
er people. The six-year-old’s ability to make decisions may not be sufficient to ground au­
tonomy rights, but when children can understand aspects of a research study, it is natural 
to show them respect by consulting them about whether they want to participate insofar 
as they can understand (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1977). For research studies that are not in the med­
ical interests of the pediatric participants, it is commonly claimed that their “assent” 
should be obtained, where possible, and their “dissent” respected (Council for Interna­
tional Organizations of Medical Sciences 2016, Guideline 17).
The question of which children are capable of giving assent and what assent and dissent 
entail is a matter of debate. Some scholars understand pediatric assent to be ethically 
equivalent to consent. Older children are often capable of autonomous decision-making. 
Even though they are not legally able to direct their own lives, they have the mental ca­
pacities necessary to do so. It is therefore reasonable to respect their assent for the same 
reason we respect adults’ consent. David Wendler and Seema Shah (2003) hold a version 
of this view. They argue that only children who are capable of making their own research 
decisions ought to have their assent solicited and respected. Since non-beneficial re­
search is primarily designed to help others, they argue that children need to understand 
the abstract and pro-social concept of altruism in order to understand a decision about 
whether to participate in research. According to Wendler and Shah, children develop 
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such an understanding between the ages of 10 and 14, so they caution against inviting 
pediatric assent before the age of 14. Others think that this is too high a standard. For ex­
ample, Jason Wasserman and Mark Navin (2018) argue that children much younger than 
14 are often capable of expressing stable preferences that ought to be given moral weight 
in medical decision-making. Soliciting a child’s preferences shows respect for the child as 
a person, and they argue that appropriate respect requires that those preferences be giv­
en defeasible moral weight in the final medical decision.29
On the flip side, we may ask what ethical weight dissent has. Parents routinely override 
their child’s dissent to activities that are in the child’s interests. In research that is not 
expected to benefit the child, however, it is generally agreed that dissent should be re­
spected (Ackerman 1979; British Medical Research Council [1991] 1998). This might stem 
from some sort of respect for children’s nascent autonomy. Alternatively, it might be 
thought that dissent is an indication that an activity would be contrary to a child’s inter­
ests, for example, because it is then likely to cause distress. Against the view that dissent 
should be respected, it might be argued that where a research study is socially important 
and could not otherwise be carried out, dissent should not always rule out enrolling a 
child. Their dissent may not emanate from a rational decision-making process. It may ex­
press confusion, anxiety, or ambivalence but not a considered objection to the research. 
Respecting such dissent is therefore not like respecting the dissent of an autonomous 
agent. Further, while researchers (and parents or guardians) should care about a child’s 
level of distress, there seems no reason to treat it differently from other research risks. 
Efforts should be made to minimize distress—after all, excessive distress might make a 
study too risky overall. However, just like any other risk to pediatric participants, distress 
can be justified by the social value of the research.
Respect and Deception
Some research studies use deceptive methods. In the past, deception was occasionally 
used to induce study enrollment.30 Today, it is typically used when a scientific question 
cannot be answered without deceiving participants in some way.31 For example, psycho­
logical studies of what makes people act in altruistic or selfish ways have to be designed 
so that they conceal the aims of the study from participants. Otherwise, the participants 
are likely to change their behavior to act in socially desirable ways.32 Sometimes studies 
have to be designed so that participants are not even aware that they are in research. 
Many field experiments in economics and political science are designed to see whether 
and how certain interventions or policies affect citizens’ behavior as they go about their 
daily lives.33 Take, for example, a study designed to see whether voters are more likely to 
turn out if they engage with material encouraging them to vote.34 During an election, a 
randomly selected group might be sent flyers encouraging turnout. Their voting behavior 
is then compared to a control group who received no such information. But if these citi­
zens knew they were being studied, they might change their voting behavior, thereby un­
dermining the scientific validity of the research.
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Deception involves one party deliberately inducing another party to believe something 
that the first thinks is untrue.35 Most people think that deception is disrespectful, and it is 
generally thought to be wrong without justification. One plausible explanation of what 
makes deception wrongful is that it involves a breach of trust (Williams 2002, chap. 5). 
The person who lies, for example, invites a listener to believe what they are saying and 
then betrays the listener’s trust in their veracity. The disrespect shown to the person who 
is lied to is already inherent in this explanation.36 Further, where the deception is part of 
a consent process, it can also invalidate consent. It does this if it either misleads the per­
son giving consent about what they are consenting to or if it misleads them about some 
fact that is relevant to their consent decision and thereby illegitimately controls the deci­
sion. In the former case, deception violates the understanding requirement. In the latter 
case, it undermines voluntariness.
Some research ethicists think that it may be possible to conduct some deceptive research 
that shows appropriate recognition respect to rights-holders. They point out that it is pos­
sible to inform prospective participants that a study involves deception without informing 
them about the nature of that deception (Wendler and Miller 2004). Without undermining 
the scientific validity of the study, participants can be asked whether they are willing to 
be deceived in order to answer a scientific question. This means that instead of someone 
else making the decision about whether deception is acceptable to them, they get to 
make that decision. In this way, it might be possible to deceive and respect participants.
Whether this “authorized deception” can address the ethical challenges with deceiving 
participants will depend on several considerations. First, it depends on how expansive the 
understanding requirement for informed consent is. On a minimal view of the require­
ment, participants could be ignorant of many details of the research and still give valid 
consent. More expansive views will necessarily limit the information that can be withheld 
from participants. Second, it depends on whether authorized deception is consistent with 
achieving the scientific aims of the study. It is possible that participants who are informed 
that they are going to be deceived will thereby be on the lookout for deception and that 
this will influence their responses. The extent to which authorized deception would inter­
fere with the science in this way is an empirical question.37
Research without Consent
One way we respect competent adults is by obtaining their valid consent to research par­
ticipation. However, some important scientific questions would be unanswerable—or 
much harder to answer—if valid consent were required. As noted in the previous section, 
many field experiments in the social sciences do not tell participants that they are in­
volved in research studies for fear of influencing their responses. Research with stored bi­
ological samples may take place without donors’ knowledge and so without their express 
permission. Large data sets, from mobile phone data, government records, electronic 
health records and the like, allow for potentially transformative population-level re­
search; but few people have agreed to the researchers’ specific uses of their data. Where 
researchers could identify participants, the data sets may be so large that contacting and 
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consenting all of them would make the research project too expensive to be worthwhile. 
Yet it is increasingly challenging to anonymize data, so proceeding without participants’ 
consent not only violates their rights to self-determination but also risks violations of their 
privacy rights.38 Other studies, such as cluster-randomized trials and policy experiments, 
are hard to conduct in a scientifically valid way if individuals within clusters or subject to 
policies can opt out.
It seems disrespectful to conduct research on competent adults without valid consent and 
yet some important scientific questions would be unanswerable if consent were required. 
This prompts two questions. First, is it permissible to conduct some research studies on 
competent adults without their consent? If so, under what circumstances? Second, if it is 
permissible to conduct a research study on competent adults without their consent, is it 
also possible to conduct that research in a way that shows appropriate respect?
Our theoretical analysis can help answer these questions. Regarding the permissibility of 
research without consent, two cases can be distinguished. One is when the research pro­
cedures would not violate participants’ rights.39 Most medical research includes acts that 
would constitute rights violations without valid consent. Take a blood draw. It is an act of 
bodily trespass, and the reason a researcher has a duty to obtain valid consent before 
proceeding with it is that the participant has a claim right to bodily integrity. As the 
rights-holder, only the participant has the power to exercise or waive that right, which 
they can do by giving or refusing consent. But not all studies include acts over which the 
participant has an autonomy right. For example, Douglas Mackay and Averi Chakrabarti 
discuss a variety of government policy studies in which governments have “a right to rule 
over the spheres of action targeted by the research” (2019, 194), and collecting the data 
needed to complete these experiments would not infringe participants’ autonomy rights. 
For example, take a randomized controlled trial comparing two anti-poverty programs. 
Provided that data collection does not infringe participants’ rights, there is no threat of a 
rights violation because the government has the legal authority to institute these policies, 
so it follows that there’s no duty on the part of the researcher to obtain consent for study 
acts.
But what about when the research does involve procedures that participants have the 
right to refuse? Conducting such research without consent might be defended on the 
widely accepted grounds that rights have thresholds (see subsection “Rights”). The social 
value of the research might then be argued to override the individual’s right. Whether 
this bar has been met for any particular research project will depend on three factors: the 
strength of the right (e.g., the threshold for overriding the right to control personal infor­
mation will be lower than the threshold for overriding the right to bodily integrity), the 
social value of the proposed research (e.g., how important is the information about can­
cer that can be generated from this collection of leftover tumor specimens?), and the dif­
ficulty of obtaining the information that the research would generate without overriding a 
right (e.g., is deception necessary to get valid data? Would tracking down sample donors 
really be too expensive?).
Respect for Persons
Page 20 of 30
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 16 December 2020
Our answers to the first question suggest an answer to the second: research without con­
sent can fully respect rights-holders only when it does not violate their rights. There is 
nothing inherently disrespectful about conducting research without consent when that re­
search does not undermine, threaten, or otherwise usurp its participants’ rights to self- 
determination. However, we cannot say the same thing when participants’ rights are in­
fringed. When we judge that it is permissible, all things considered, to override partici­
pants’ rights in order to conduct research, we still wrong them, and we do so in a way 
that is inherently disrespectful. First, we usurp their agency by interfering with or mak­
ing a decision that is rightfully theirs to make. Second, our interference may control their 
enrollment decision—that is, the participant might not have enrolled in the research had 
they been consulted properly. The fact that participants are wronged—even if the re­
search is justified on balance—explains why it is right to think that they are owed some­
thing: an explanation or debrief, an apology, or post-trial benefits.
Conclusion
The principle of respect for persons is foundational in research ethics, but its interpreta­
tion is challenging. Scholars disagree about what persons are, which makes it hard to de­
termine the principle’s foundation, content, and scope. Informed by this disagreement, 
we have offered an analysis that makes as few unnecessary theoretical commitments as 
possible. Instead of grounding it on a contested view of persons, we have argued that 
since all plausible views of personhood agree that persons are rights-holders, the princi­
ple can be usefully understood as requiring recognition respect for rights-holders.
This interpretation captures the sentiment of the principle expressed in research ethics 
documents, and it explains classic expressions of respect in research. Take, for example, 
the ethical requirement that valid consent be obtained for most research studies that en­
roll competent adults. When we require that a competent adult gives valid consent to cer­
tain acts in a study that would otherwise constitute rights violations, we recognize and re­
spect that the decision at hand is that person’s to make. In addition, this interpretation of 
the principle allows us to derive clear and useful guidance about what constitutes respect 
for persons in certain contexts (e.g., how to disclose information to guard against miscon­
ceptions), while recognizing what constitutes respect for persons in other contexts is le­
gitimately contested (e.g., when and how to involve children in decisions about research 
participation).
Disclaimer
The views expressed are the authors’ own. They do not represent the position or policy of 
the National Institutes of Health, the US Public Health Service, or any other part of the 
US government.
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Notes:
(2.) For examples, see Hudson (1980) and Neumann (2004).
(3.) For example, see Buss (1999).
(4.) As Jeremy Bentham famously put it, “The question is not Can they reason? or Can 
they talk? but Can they suffer?” ([1789] 1907).
(5.) Cf. Regan (2004). For more on why obtaining valuable knowledge may not be suffi­
cient to justify the harm or death of nonhuman animals either, see DeGrazia and Sebo 
(2015) and Sebo and DeGrazia (2020).
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(6.) This has important ethical and legal implications. For example, it is generally agreed 
that personhood grounds moral and legal rights, but in current US law only persons have 
the capacity for rights. Hence, securing legal recognition of nonhuman animal rights re­
quires challenging the view—enshrined in the law—that all and only humans are persons. 
See Andrews et al. (2018).
(7.) Non-sentient humans fall into two categories. There are those who are permanently 
incapable of sentience, such as anencephalic infants, who are born without a cerebrum. It 
is generally uncontroversial that such infants do not merit the same protections as per­
sons. There are then those who are not currently capable of sentience but might become 
capable, such as early-term fetuses. Their status is more controversial since some think 
that the potential to develop certain characteristics is sufficient for personhood. We do 
not address this issue here.
(8.) For example, see Jaworska (1999).
(9.) See DeGrazia (1996, 2014).
(10.) Italics added.
(11.) We lack the space here to consider foundational questions about the grounds for 
rights. For an introduction to the philosophical discussion, see Wenar (2015).
(12.) See, also, Thomson (1990).
(13.) For discussion, see Brennan (2009) and Thomson (1990).
(14.) See, e.g., CIOMS (2016, Guideline 11).
(15.) The reader may have noted that we use the language of “valid consent” rather than 
“informed consent.” “Valid consent” is given when the person giving consent successfully 
exercises their autonomy rights in the way just described. “Informed consent,” which is a 
term of art within bioethics, typically includes valid consent but sometimes appears to in­
volve more.
(16.) We treat the terms “competence” and “capacity” as synonyms.
(17.) See Faden, Beauchamp, and King (1986).
(18.) Here is the explanation of the basic idea behind MRIs from the introduction to the 
Wikipedia page on “Magnetic resonance imaging”:
Certain atomic nuclei are able to absorb and emit radio frequency energy when 
placed in an external magnetic field. In clinical and research MRI, hydrogen atoms 
are most often used to generate a detectable radio-frequency signal that is re­
ceived by antennas in close proximity to the anatomy being examined. Hydrogen 
atoms are naturally abundant in people and other biological organisms, particular­
ly in water and fat. For this reason, most MRI scans essentially map the location of 
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water and fat in the body. Pulses of radio waves excite the nuclear spin energy 
transition, and magnetic field gradients localize the signal in space. By varying the 
parameters of the pulse sequence, different contrasts may be generated between 
tissues based on the relaxation properties of the hydrogen atoms therein.
(19.) See, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman (2011).
(20.) Some might think that the requirement to disclose certain facts is a marker of in­
formed consent, as contrasted with consent simpliciter. Elsewhere, we argue that certain 
facts ought to be disclosed in order for consent to be valid in all domains in which con­
sent operates and that this is not special to informed consent. See Bromwich and Millum 
(2015) and Millum and Bromwich (2018).
(21.) For evidence-based tips on designing consent forms that are easier to understand, 
see Denzen et al. (2012).
(22.) See, for example, Gert, Culver, and Clouser (1997), Sreenivasan (2003), and Miller 
and Wertheimer (2011).
(23.) One exception may be cases of third-party coercion wherein one individual coerces 
another into giving consent to a third party (the researcher). See Millum (2014).
(24.) See, for example, Flory, Wendler, and Emanuel (2008) and Mandava et al. (2012).
(25.) There is some debate over the correct way to characterize the therapeutic miscon­
ception and, consequently, over how to measure and prevent it. See Henderson et al. 
(2007) and Kimmelman (2007).
(26.) See, for example, National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bio­
medical and Behavioral Research (1977), US Department of Health and Human Services, 
National Institutes of Health, and Office for Human Research Protections (2018), and 
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (2016, Guideline 17).
(27.) The US Department of Health and Human Services (2015) archived webpage from 
September 30, 2015, lists just 10 studies that were reviewed under 45 CFR 46.407.
(28.) See, for example, South Africa Department of Health (2015), UK Medical Research 
Council (2004), Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineer­
ing Research Council of Canada, and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council 
(2018). None of these allow an exception to the rules like the United States. The latter 
two are also more restrictive about the upper limits of risks in pediatric research.
(29.) See also Redmon (1986).
(30.) For example, in 1963, three medical researchers at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hos­
pital in Brooklyn, New York, injected live cancer cells into 22 chronically ill patients. The 
doctors did not tell these patients that the injection contained live cancer cells or that the 
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procedure was experimental because they feared that “the phobia and ignorance that sur­
rounds the word cancer” would cause these patients to refuse study participation (Katz 
1972).
(31.) We should distinguish cases of deception from cases in which information is deliber­
ately and explicitly withheld from participants. For example, in a blinded randomized con­
trolled trial, participants are randomly assigned to an arm of the trial and do not know 
which arm it is. They may not know, for instance, whether they are receiving an active 
drug or a placebo. Yet, while they do not know which arm they are in because that infor­
mation is withheld from them, they are clearly not deceived about the nature of the re­
search or the possibility that they are only receiving a placebo. See Wendler and Miller 
(2008).
(32.) See, for example, Darley and Batson’s (1973) famous study of theology students who 
were directed so that they would pass an apparent “victim” slumped in an alley. Helping 
behavior was predicted by how much of a hurry the participants were in but not by prim­
ing with the parable of the Good Samaritan.
(33.) See Desposato (this volume) and Glennerster and Powers (2016).
(34.) See, for example, Green and Gerber (2015).
(35.) See Mahon (2016).
(36.) If deception is disrespectful to research participants, does that mean that it should 
be forbidden? Not always. In the following section, we describe the conditions that must 
be met in order to justify research without consent, which includes research that invali­
dates consent through deception. The considerations described there will also apply to 
justifying the disrespect inherent in deceiving participants in cases where consent is not 
undermined. Whether the deception is justified will depend on the strength of the partici­
pants’ claim against being deceived, the social value of the research, and how essential 
the deception is to realizing that social value.
(37.) For an attempt to answer this question in the context of pain research, see Martin 
and Katz (2010).
(38.) For a recent discussion of these issues, see Ballantyne and Schaefer (2020).
(39.) Here, we are in agreement with Gelinas, Wertheimer, and Miller (2016) and MacKay 
and Chakrabarti (2019).
Joseph Millum
Clinical Center Department of Bioethics & Fogarty International Center, National In­
stitutes of Health, USA
Danielle Bromwich
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